INTRODUCTION
In Wade v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held that a prosecutor's decision not to file a motion for a reduction of sentence based on a defendant's substantial assistance to the government is reviewable by district courts. WhileJustice Souter, writing for the majority, does potentially put a cap on prosecutorial discretion in this area, he fails to clear up much of the confusion that had been accumulating in the lower courts.
This Note examines the background of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, specifically in relation to reduction of sentences below statutory or guideline minimums, in addition to the background of prosecutorial discretion. Next, this Note explains the lack of clear standards set forth by the Wade decision and the possible dangers that accompany this ambiguity. Finally, this Note predicts the impact Wade is likely to have both on future courts facing similar issues and on the role of prosecutors and defendants in the plea-bargaining arena.
II. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES
In response to increasing problems of drug use and distribution, violent crime, and repeat offenders, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act. 2 One of the major reforms that this legislation initiated was in the area of sentencing. This reform was embodied in the Sentencing Reform Act, which Congress passed in 6 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38, 56 (1984) , reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3239. For example, one study showed that the average sentence for bank robbery was eleven years in 1974 but that in the Northern District of Illinois it was only five and one-half years for that same year. 324-26 (1990) .
7 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988) . The constitutionality of both the Sentencing Reform Act and the Sentencing Guidelines was upheld in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) . Therein, the Court held that the United States Sentencing Commission, established as an independent commission in the judicial branch, neither violated the separation of powers principle nor was an unlawful delegation of legislative power by Congress. Id. In short, "the scope of judicial discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to Congressional control." Id. at 650.
8 See United States v. Aguilar-Pena 887 F.2d 347, 353 (1st Cir. 1989)(uniformity in sentencing was a primary goal of Congress and the Sentencing Commission); United States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1013 (Ist Cir. 1990)(it is "apodictic that the sentencing guidelines effectively stunt the wide discretion which district judges formerly enjoyed").
sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices
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To meet its stated objectives, the Sentencing Commission was charged with establishing guidelines and policy statements for federal courts to use in criminal sentencing.' 0 Consistency was sought by yielding only a narrow range of sentences from which a judge could choose when sentencing a defendant with a given set of characteristics. I"
Under the guidelines, a judge can methodically proceed through the rules to arrive at the proper sentencing range.1 2 The process begins with the "base offense level" for the crime of conviction. Then the judge "adjusts" this level either upward or downward for any "specific offense characteristics" that are present in the particular case in order to arrive at an "adjusted base offense level."' 13 This number and a number corresponding to the offender's criminal history category 14 are then applied to a sentencing table which displays the appropriate guideline range in terms of months of imprisonment.1 5 The judge must sentence the defendant within these guidelines unless he believes aggravating or mitigating circumstances are not adequately taken into consideration by the guidelines. 16 In such a case, the judge may depart by stating his 9 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988) .
10 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1988) . Judges are required to follow the guidelines provisions. However, policy statements are non-binding in that they are drafted to assist districtjudges if they decide to depart from the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5). See also United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989) (policy statements designed to assist federal judges if they decide to depart from guidelines). ' ' The possibility for disparity was further reduced by providing for extremely limited circumstances under which a judge could depart from the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988 681 (1990) , for an easy-to-follow, yet complete description of the process a judge would use in determining the appropriate sentencing range for a given offense.
13 U.S.S.G. § IBI.1. 14 The guidelines contain a table which allows one to apply a number to an individual based on their criminal history. The longer and more severe the criminal history, the higher the number. See U.S.S.G § 5A.
15 This procedure is subject to any mandatory minimum sentences that may exist for a particular offense by statute. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1 (if a statute requires imposition of a sentence other than that required by the guidelines, the statute shall control).
16 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (b) . See also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 for the sentencing guidelines' interpretation of departure under § 3553(b).
On its face, this section would appear to give judges wide latitude in determining sentences in that it allows departure both for reasons not provided in the guidelines as However, it appears the judge's power to depart from the guideline range is much more limited than it would appear on the surface. For example, the Sentencing Commission has made it clear that, except in an atypical situation, a court should not depart from the guideline range with respect to an aggravating or mitigating factor that the Commission has already taken into consideration.I Additionally, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, held that a defendant's substantial assistance to the authorities was not a mitigating circumstance of the kind "not adequately taken into consideration by the sentencing commission in formulating the guidelines .... " since § 5K1.1 adequately provides for such relief.' 9 One other possibility for departure is for "substantial assistance" on the part of the defendant. Title 18, § 3553(e) 20 of the United States Code gives a district court limited authority upon motion of the government to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum 2 1 to reflect a defendant's "substantial assistance" to the government. 22 Likewise, U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1 provides that a sentencing court may depart from the guidelines upon motion of the government. 23 These two provisions differ in that the language of well as for reasons that are, but which the judge believes are inadequate because of special circumstances surrounding a given offender. § 5K2. (1991) . A reduction of sentence for defendants who provide substantial assistance is necessary because defendants would be unlikely to cooperate with prosecutors if, despite their efforts, they were subject to mandatory minimum sentences.
23 U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1. The relevant portion of § 5Kl.1 is: "Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement). Upon motion to the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines."
See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) which states that the commission "shall assure that the § 3553(e) refers to a departure below a statutory minimum, whereas the language of § 5K 1.1 refers to a departure below the range specified by the sentencing guidelines. 24 There is virtually unanimous acceptance for the proposition that under either of these provisions, a district court may not depart absent a government motion thereto. 25 However, once a substantial assistance motion is filed, a court has discretion to determine the amount of sentence reduction, if any.
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In Wade, the defendant faced a minimum sentence of ten years under both the applicable statute and the guidelines. 2 7 Additionally, even though there was apparently some assistance given to the prosecution by the defendant, no motion for downward departure was filed. Therefore, the case squarely confronts the above issues concerning departure from both the sentencing guideline and the mandatory minimum sentence.
III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
As discussed above, one of the Sentencing Reform Act's primary goals was to abate judicial discretion in the sentencing arena. The Act appears to have been successful in this respect. 28 However, while judicial discretion may have been drastically reduced, the disguidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence.., to take into account a defendant's substantial assistance." § 5KI.1 is the Sentencing Commission answer to this mandate. Ct. 1840 Ct. , 1842 Ct. (1992 . A statutory minimum automatically becomes the minimum guideline sentence if the minimum guideline sentence would otherwise be below the statutory minimum sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5Gl.l(b).
28 A compliance study conducted by the Sentencing Commission found that 81.1% of all sentences imposed nationwide during a nine month period fell within the guideline range. Of the other 19.9%, in 5.7% of the cases the court departed downward based on a motion for substantial assistance, in 9.7% the court departed downward for other reasons, and in 3.4% of the cases the court departed upward. This leaves only 1.1% of the cases which did not follow the guidelines provisions. Lee, supra note 12, at 703 n.32. where the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that "while the remedy adopted by Congress has reduced the opportunity for sentencing disparities caused by judges, it has not solved the overall disparity problem but has merely shifted responsibility therefore to other officials." This Note will argue, inter alia, that the decision in Wade may further the shift of discretion from the judges to prosecutors by narrowly defining the opportunities a defendant has to challenge a prosecutor's decision to file a motion for substantial assistance. To understand the issues raised by Wade, it is important to understand the types of discretion typically granted to prosecutors and the limits put on these grants of discretion.
Prosecutors are granted broad discretion in many areas. These include, but are not limited to, the decision whether to investigate, grant immunity, or plea bargain, what recommendation to make under the Sentencing Guidelines, and the determination as to whether, what, when, and where charges should be brought. 3 1 However, the most typical exercise of discretion, i.e. the most litigated, and therefore the focus of this section, is the decision whether to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions. have, or rather, how deferential the courts should be. The conflict between prosecutors and the courts is primarily governed by an unusual combination of the doctrines of separation of powers and equal protection. As a rule of thumb, judges will defer to a prosecutor's broad discretion to initiate and conduct criminal prosecutions. 3 4 The basis for deferring to prosecutors is that courts have widely acknowledged that these decisions are ill-suited for judicial review. 3 5 Therefore, a rebuttable presumption has arisen that prosecutions are undertaken in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory manner. 3 6 However, while prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not "unfettered.-3 7 "Selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws . . .is subject to constitutional constraints. ' 3 8 Decisions to prosecute may generally come under attack in two ways. As discussed below, the first constitutional attack is vindictive prosecution, which violates a defendant's due process rights. 39 The second attack is selective or discriminatory prosecution, which denies a defendant equal protection of the laws.
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A.
VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION A defendant is entitled to exercise all of his constitutional and statutory rights "without apprehension that the state will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one."1 4 1 If a prosecutor does penalize a defendant for exercising his rights (for in-33 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § § 13.4, 13.5 (1984) . 34 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)("so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.").
35 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)("broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review"). Underlying the belief that these decisions are ill-suited for judicial review is the belief that the factors which need to be considered in deciding whether to prosecute are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis courts are competent to undertake, and that the systematic costs of that these examinations would likely cause are too high. A selective prosecution claim arises when a prosecutor improperly selects an individual for prosecution. While defendants often claim that a prosecutor's decision to prosecute has been selective and violative of equal protection, these claims rarely succeed. The underlying reason for this is that defendants must overcome the presumption that criminal prosecutions are undertaken in good faith. 44 However, it is not at all clear what a defendant is required to show to overcome this presumption. The reasons for this uncertainty are two-fold. First, the necessary elements for a successful claim of selective prosecution have been enunciated inconsistently. Second, courts have not clearly established the means for a defendant to prove these elements. The elements of a claim of selective prosecution have been enunciated in a myriad of ways. In Wayte v. United States, 4 6 the Supreme Court held that a petitioner seeking to prove selective prosecution must show that the decision to prosecute "had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose." ' 4 7 Under this standard, discriminatory treatment arises if other violators similarly situated are not prosecuted, whereas discriminatory purpose occurs if selection "was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.
' 48 However, the dissent in Wayte argued a different standard was applicable. In applying the standard used in Castaneda v. Partida 49 to selective prosecution, Justice Marshall argued that in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, a defendant must make a non- 
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frivolous showing of the three elements of a prima facie case of selective prosecution. Justice Marshall explained that to make out a prima facie case of selective prosecution, an offender must show that (1) he is a member of a "recognizable" and "distinct" class; (2) a disproportionate number of this class was selected for investigation and possible prosecution; and (3) the selection procedure "was subject to abuse or was otherwise not neutral."
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A third standard for selective prosecution has been articulated, which encompasses a different set of three essential elements. 5 ' These three elements are: (1) that other similarly situated offenders have not been prosecuted; 52 (2) the selection of this particular offender was intentional or purposeful; 53 and (3) the selection was pursuant to an arbitrary classification.
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Whichever standard is used, the defendant bears the initial burden of demonstrating selective enforcement because courts assume criminal prosecutions are undertaken in good faith. But, the courts have varied in their determinations of what this burden entails. 5 5 More important for the defendant, however, is that he at least make a sufficient threshold showing 56 to be entitled to an evidentiary 53 In Oyler v. Boyles, the Supreme Court said that in order for there to be an equal protection violation the selection must have been "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard." 368 U.S. 448, 506 (1962) . While it is clear that intent is necessary, what level of culpability the courts will actually require has not been precisely defined. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 33, at § 13.4(d). 54 In Oyler, 368 U.S. at 506, the Supreme Court stated that an "arbitrary classification" entails more than "the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement." To determine what an arbitrary classification is, it is generally appropriate to determine whether there is a rational relationship between the classification and the stated objectives (a few classes are usually subject to stricter testes [Vol. 83 hearing. 57 The allegations a defendant must make in order to constitute a threshold showing have been described in a variety of ways, including: (1) facts sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a prosecutor's purpose, (2) a non-frivolous showing of the essential elements of the claim, (3) sufficient facts to establish a "colorable basis" for his claim, or (4) establishment of a prima facie case. 58 If a defendant is denied an evidentiary hearing because he is unable to meet this burden, he will find it extremely difficult to make the specific allegations that are required to prove selective prosecution.
As will be discussed below, the decision in Wade has the potential to further shift discretion from judges to prosecutors. The reason for this, as will be described, is that the focus ofJustice Souter's decision is the application of a selective prosecution case to the previously unchartered area of a prosecutor's discretion in sentencing. In determining whether this application actually increases the prosecutor's discretion, this Note will examine whether the areas of selective prosecution and sentencing are similar enough to warrant the analogy that Justice Souter makes.
IV. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Harold Ray Wade, Jr. was arrested in October 1989 after police officers searched his home and found 978 grams of cocaine, two handguns, and more than $22,000 in cash. 5 9 Following his arrest Wade began to cooperate with the authorities, presumably in anticipation of leniency from the government. 60 Both the level and usefulness of this cooperation is disputed. Wade subsequently pled guilty to conspiring to distribute cocaine and to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988); and to using a firearm during a 57 An evidentiary hearing is crucial to a defendant because it allows him to obtain discovery. Wade's counsel did not object to the calculation of this guideline range in the Presentence Report. 6 5 However, counsel did raise the issue of petitioner's cooperation. Essentially, he attempted to question why the prosecutor chose not to make a motion for downward departure from the sentencing guidelines for petitioner's "substantial assistance" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1991) or U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1. 66 The district court responded that without such a motion from the government, it had no power to impose a sentence beneath the statutory minimum.
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The Court of Appeals for the Fourt Circuit affirmed, holding that while it appeared that the defendant had cooperated and provided valuable assistance to the government, absent a motion from the government, courts lacked the authority under the "unambigu- 62 Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1842. Wade entered his guilty plea without the benefit of a plea agreement. Id. at 1843.
Section 841 (a)(I) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." Section 924(c)(1), in relevant part, reads: Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years... Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend the sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried. No person sentenced under this subsection shall be eligible for parole during the term of imprisonment imposed herein. 63 Id. at 1842. 64 For the firearm count, the Presentence Report noted that the five-year mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) was the same as the Federal Sentencing Guidelines sentence under § 2K2.4(a). This was to be served consecutively. Brief for the United States, supra note 61, at 7. 65 Id. ous language" of § 3553(e) to downward depart from mandatory minimum sentences in consideration of the substantial assistance of a defendant. 6 8 Additionally, the court of appeals said that since the government has "sole discretion in deciding whether to file a motion for downward departure for substantial assistance, 6 9 it follows that the defendant may not inquire into the government's reasons and motives if the government does not make such a motion." '70 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a district court has the power to review a prosecutor's decision not to file a motion for departure below a mandatory minimum sentence based on the defendant's substantial assistance.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Souter held that contrary to the position taken by the court of appeals, district courts do indeed have the authority to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a motion for a reduction of sentence below a statutory minimum based on a defendant's substantial assistance to the government. The Court held, however, that this authority is limited to the instances where the prosecutor's refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive. 7 3 Thus, the Court affirmed the result reached in the Fourth Circuit 74 because the defendant had not made the requisite allegations of unconstitutional motive necessary to entitle him to further review. Justice Souter began his sparse opinion with a discussion of the two applicable statutes under which the government is empowered to file a mo.tion for reduction based on a defendant's substantial 69 This assumes that no plea agreement existed between the defendant and the government whereby the defendant could assure himself of the benefits of § 3553(e) or § 5K1.1 by agreeing to provide substantial assistance in return for the government's commitment to file a motion for downward departure at sentencing. 70 Wade, 936 F.2d at 172. Curiously, however, in responding to Wade's assertion that he should be permitted to question the good faith of the government in refusing to make a motion, the court of appeals suggested that a motion may not be necessary if there was prosecutorial bad faith or arbitrariness that could present a due process violation. Id. Nevertheless, the court's refusal to examine such a possibility in the present case, in addition to its later statement that a "defendant may not inquire into the government's reasons and motives," indicate that the court did not give much effect to its earlier statement; instead it came to the conclusion that the prosecutor's decision could not be challenged for any reason. Id. 76 The petitioner conceded, and therefore Justice Souter did not address, that as a matter of statutory interpretation the two provisions require the government to file a motion in order for the district court to have the authority to depart from a minimum sentence. 7 7 Furthermore, petitioner did not claim that the government motion requirement itself was unconstitutional; 78 nor did he claim that the motion requirement was superseded by a plea agreement whereby the government agreed to file such a motion. 79 The result was that Justice Souter held that both § 3553(e) and § 5Kl.1 give the government the power, but not the duty, to file a motion when a defendant has substantially assisted the government.
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Justice Souter next examined whether a prosecutor's discretion in exercising this power is subject to constitutional limitations. He concluded that a prosecutor's decision whether to file a substantial assistance motion should be treated similarly to other decisions made by a prosecutor. 8 The relevant portion of § 5K1.1 is: "Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement) Upon motion to the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines." U.S.S.G. § 5Kl.1.
Although at first glance these two passages may appear to serve the same function, there is one important difference. Section 3553(e) provides for a reduction below a mandatory minimum sentence, while § 5Kl.1 provides for a reduction below the sentencing guidelines. A situation could quite conceivably arise where, because of aggravating factors, the guidelines provided for a sentence higher than the statutory minimum. See, e.g., United States v. Cheng Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1991). Here the parties assumed, and the Court agreed, that where the minimum under the guidelines is the same as the statutory minimum, the "two provisions pose two identical and equally burdensome obstacles. 1992) ) (in inquiring into whether prosecutor abused her discretion in plea bargaining, it is not enough that a prosecutor's decisions had a discriminatory effect; the court must also find that the prosecutor was motivated by a discriminatory purpose); United States v.Jacob, 781 F.2d 643, 646-47 (8th Cir. 1986) (defendant must make a threshold showing of the essential elements of selective prosection to obtain discovery or a hearing); United States v. Gallegos-Curiel, 681 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1982) (in a case alleging vindictive prosecution, there must be a threshold showing of vindictiveness before the court can inquire into the prosecutor's motives); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d
Also, he noted that Wade conceded that a "substantial threshold showing" was necessary to have a right to discovery or an evidentiary hearing. 91 From this discussion, Justice Souter ascertained that Wade never claimed to have evidence showing that the government acted for "suspect reasons such as his race or religion." 9 2
Justice Souter concluded by indicating that Wade would be entitled to relief if the "prosecutor's refusal to move was not rationally related to any legitimate government end."1 9 3 However, once again, Justice Souter held that Wade did not allege such a claim. 9 4 Therefore, he affirmed the Fourth Circuit's judgment.
VI. ANALYSIS
In Wade v. United States, Justice Souter explored the previously unchartered waters of a prosecutor's discretion in deciding whether to file a motion in consideration of a defendant's substantial assistance. However, instead of using this opportunity to clear up some of the murkiness created in this area by the circuit courts, 9 5 Justice Souter adds to it by failing to effect any positive change through this decision. This failure comes in two main areas: 1) relevant issues the Court chose not to address and 2) lack of clarity and specificity in the standards (or lack thereof) set out by the Court.
A. ISSUES THE COURT CHOSE NOT TO ADDRESS
The Court's decision in Wade v. United States is based on the interpretation of two statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (must elicit evidence of essential elements of selective prosecution to be entitled to discovery).
91 Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 60, at 18-19. 92 Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844. Petitioner claimed that the district court prevented him from presenting such evidence because the court believed that it did not have any power to review a prosecutor's decision. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 60, at 19. Therefore, the petitioner was seeking a remand to develop a claim that the government violated his constitutional rights by refusing to file the motion "arbitrarily" or "in bad faith." Id. However, Justice Souter said the district court expressly invited Wade's attorney to do so, but his counsel took the opportunity to merely detail the extent of Wade [Vol. 83 § 5Kl.1. Both impose a requirement that there be a government motion in order for a court to reduce a defendant's sentence below either a statutory minimum or a guideline minimum, respectively. This motion requirement has been determined to be constitutional by virtually all of the circuits. 96 However, although the statutes may not be violative of the Constitution, this fact alone does not insure that they serve their intended purpose.
Section 3553(e) is, on its face, satisfactorily unambiguous and, like all statutes, binding. 9 7 Section 5K1.1, enacted by the Sentencing Commission, is not as clear. The ambiguity in U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 becomes apparent when it is compared to 28 U.S.C. § 994(n). The latter statute states that the guidelines should provide for substantial assistance. 98 The section, entitled "Duties of the Commission," says the guidelines should allow for sentences below statutory minimums where a defendant has provided substantial assistance to the government. 9 9 However, § 5KI.1 leaves this decision to the discretion of the prosecutor which does not "assure" a defendant of a reduction in sentence. Furthermore, ambiguity arises because § 5Ki.1 is a policy statement, rather than a guideline, raising the The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence that is lower than that established by a statute as a minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. 28 U.S.C. § 994(n)(1988) (emphasis added).
issue of whether the section is binding on judges. Some have suggested that policy statements are not binding on the courts but are merely suggestions that courts should follow. 10 0 If this were so, a court could depart without a government motion so long as it only departs below the guideline range, 1 1 and not below a minimum sentence imposed by statute.' 0 2 As a result, it is not clear that the Commission, in passing § 5K1.1, did what § 994(n) mandates-i.e., "assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness" of imposing a lower sentence for substantial assistance.' 0 3 Nevertheless, most courts have rejected the argument that § 5K1.1 offers a defendant inadequate protection; rather, they have found that § 5K1.1 both reasonably effects the intent of § 994(n)1 04 and has the binding force of a guideline.1 0 5
Justice Souter, however, did not discuss these contentions in his decision. He either refused to address these problems or framed the issues so that they were irrelevant. The courts generally give two reasons for this interpretation. The first is that the language of § 5KI.1 is consistent with § 994(n). While the statute uses the word "assure," this should not be taken to mean that the judge must take a defendant's assistance into account in every case. Lewis, 896 F.2d at 248. This is because § 994(n) only requires that the guidelines recognize the "general appropriateness" of reducing a sentence for substantial assistance. Id. This requirement is "predicated on the reasonable assumption that the government is in the best position to supply the court with an accurate report of the defendant's assistance." White, 869 F.2d at 248.
Secondly, § 994(n)'s parallel provision, § 3553(e), imposes a government motion requirement. Furthermore, § 3553(e) provides that the court shall impose a lower sentence "in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to § 994." Because of the interrelation between the two sections, it is entirely appropriate for the same burden to be imposed under § 994(n) as is under § 3553(e). Since this is what § 5KI .1 does, courts have held that it appropriately effects the purpose of § 994(n). 
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used this opportunity to dear up some of the dissension among the lower courts.107 This is especially true considering that dissension among the circuits was a likely motivation for the Court's granting certiorari.
Another potentially significant issue thatJustice Souter failed to address is plea agreements. Courts have held that plea agreements requiring the government to file a motion for a reduction in sentence are enforceable; 0 8 Justice Souter acknowledged this in Wade. However, Wade never entered into a plea agreement with the prosecution. The failure to do so led to his eventual misfortune. Harold Wade pled guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement to federal drug and firearm charges, which carried a combined mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years.' 0 9 Nevertheless, he assisted the government, presumably in the hopes that his sentence would be reduced. For some unknown reason, Wade did not enter into a plea agreement, but instead spontaneously offered the prosecutor information." 1 0 The prosecutor accepted this information and used it to his advantage."' However, instead of inquiring into the possible 107 InJustice Souter's defense, this case invoked both statutes equally, so that even if the ambiguity surrounding § 5Kl was significant, thereby possibly allowing the judge to depart without a motion by the government, he could not depart below the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by statute. This minimum sentence posed a burden (motion requirement) and a sentence (ten-year prison term) equal to that of the sentencing guidelines. However, this does not necessarily preclude Justice Souter from resolving ambiguities in one of the statutes fundamental to the decision at hand, namely § 5KI1.. 109 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 60, at 6. 110 Id. The most likely reason was that the prosecutor, knowing that Wade had already pled guilty and was therefore basically out of options, refused to bind himself to an express agreement.
111 Brief for United States, supra note 61, at 7. The United States never argued that Harold Wade did not assist the government. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit found that Wade had provided valuable assistance. United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169, 170 (4th Cir. 1991). The United States' argument relied on the fact that the prosecutor has sole discretion whether to file a motion regardless of whether substantial assistance was provided. Note, however, that respondents do mention in their brief that there was what they labeled a "wholly legitimate reason for the prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance motion," namely alleged obstruction ofjustice on the part of Wade. Brief for United States, supra note 61, at 20.
In that the government used the information Wade provided, there seems to be little reason why the court should not find that an implied contract existed. Such a contract could be implied in two ways. The first would be to imply the contract in fact. The underlying premise is that by supplying information to the government, Wade made a unilateral offer, which the prosecutor accepted by using this information. Second, a contract could be implied in law on the basis that the prosecutor would be unjustly enriched if he used the information provided by the defendant without giving anything (consideration) in return. Wade's information does not appear to be gratuitous because reasons for this inequitable result, Justice Souter simply mentioned that Wade conceded that there was no plea agreement.' 1 2
Finally, Justice Souter noted that the parties conceded that a government motion was necessary, that the motion requirement was constitutional, and that this condition was not superseded in this case by an agreement with the government. 113 By acquiescing to the parties' sentiments concerning these issues, Justice Souter was unable to reach a series of holdings which would have resolved conflicts among the circuits. While none of these may have been the primary issue of the case, the lack of consensus in this area seemed to warrant a more complete discussion." 14 Justice Souter's failure to resolve the apparent ambiguities in § 5Kl.1, his failure to address plea agreements, and his failure to reconcile the disagreement in the circuits demonstrate his unwillingness to make this case significant. Ironically, as this Note will discuss below, even when Justice Souter did address issues, the result was more confusion than a resolution of significant issues.
B. THE COURT'S FAILURE TO ENUNCIATE STANDARDS CLEARLY
Justice Souter's opinion failed to enunciate clear standards to govern future cases. First, the Court failed to define the standards to govern the amount of discretion a prosecutor should have in his decision to file a motion for a reduction in sentence based on a defendant's substantial assistance. Second, the Court failed to clarify or explain even those standards that are enunciated in the opinion.
In deciding Wade, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit laid down an exceptionally narrow view of the federal courts' inherent power to supervise proceedings before them. 1 5 Not only did the Fourth Circuit agree with most other courts, which had held that the government motion was necessary for a court to sentence a defendant to something less than the statutory minimum most drug dealers are not so altruistic as to freely give up such valuable information. In addition, the information does not appear to be officious because prosecutors are almost always seeking information of this sort. Once the contract is implied, it could be specifically enforced, which is a generally accepted remedy in plea bargain disputes. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). Specifically enforcing the contract would force the government to file a motion. This procedure seems like an effective course of action for an innovative (and possibly daring) judge who felt handcuffed by the motion requirement. 
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(stating that 3553(e) was unambiguous), but it went on to say that the prosecutor's decision whether to file the motion was unreviewable.' 16 The extreme view taken by the Fourth Circuit was likely a motivating factor in the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari.
Justice Souter affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision, although he set slightly different parameters with respect to the appropriate review of a prosecutor's decision not to file a motion for substantial assistance.' 17 However, Justice Souter's ambiguous language makes these parameters difficult to ascertain. Justice Souter's approach of accepting the parties' sentiments regarding certain issues and his apparent unwillingness to address others, as described above, left one issue in the case: whether a prosecutor's discretion, in deciding whether to file a motion in recognition of a defendant's substantial assistance, is subject to any limitations. 1 18 The petitioner argued that the prosecutor's discretion in filing a motion for substantial assistance must be subject to limited judicial review; otherwise, a central purpose of the sentence reforms-the elimination of unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records-would be undermined. 1 1 9 Justice Souter agreed with the petitioner and held that the government motion requirement was reviewable. 120 Unlike the Fourth Circuit, Justice Souter apparently recognized the serious procedural due process concerns that would arise if he held otherwise.
1
Typically, a discussion of prosecutorial discretion necessitates a discussion of two separate standards. The first is the standard that 121 These procedural due process concerns are analytically separate from the substantive due process concerns that have been mounted against the government motion requirement itself. The latter due process concerns have been uniformly rejected. See cases cited supra note 96.
The procedural due process concerns, on the other hand, are not challenging the constitutionality of the motion requirement, only that interpreting that requirement to forbid all judicial review of a prosecutor's decision to file a substantial assistance motion would make the statute unconstitutional. While the Constitution may not prevent Congress from making a defendant's cooperation totally irrelevant, once Congress decides to make it a factor, it must not set up procedures that contravene the procedural re- must be met in order for the petitioner to prevail on a claim that a prosecutor's decision was improper. The second standard is a degree of the first. It is what must be met in order for the petitioner to be entitled to discovery and an evidentiary hearing. However, in his attempt to apply the Court's existing prosecutorial discretion jurisprudence to this new area, Justice Souter was cryptic in his discussion of both standards.
Justice Souter never outlined what Wade must show to be entitled to relief. Instead he asserted that even if the standards which Wade proposed were accepted, Wade had not shown enough under those standards to be entitled to relief. 122 Justice Souter, however, did not say whether the standards proposed by Wade were the correct standards to be applied.1 23 Justice Souter walked through each of Wade's claims and stated that even if true, Wade would not be entitled to relief because he had not met that claim as proposed. Justice Souter did not say, however, that either of the claims themselves (to require the government to file a motion or to be granted discovery and an evidentiary hearing) were inadequate.
For example, Justice Souter stated that a prosecutor's discretion in filing a motion for substantial assistance is subject to constitutional limitations because there is "no reason why courts should treat a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion differently from a prosecutor's other decisions."' 124 In support of this assertion, Justice Souter cited Wayte v. United States, 125 a selective prosecution case.
126
In Wayte, Justice Powell, writing for the majority, used a standard equal protection analysis in reaching the conclusion that the decision to prosecute may not be "'deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.' "127 Justice Powell then discussed the necessary elements of 122 Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844. 123 For example, Justice Souter could have been demonstrating that Wade could not even meet the standards he enunciated, implying that the "appropriate" standard would be more difficult to meet. Alternatively, he could have been acknowledging the standards enunciated by Wade as "correct" but simply saying that Wade had failed to meet them. 124 [Vol. 83 SENTENCING DISCRETION a claim of selective prosecution. 128 The Court held that in order to succeed on such a claim, a defendant must show both that the policy had a "discriminatory effect" and that it was motivated by a "discriminatory purpose."' 129 The justices in Wayte, however, disagreed on the appropriate standard for evaluating selective prosecution claims. The dissent in Wayte argued that the standard used in the area of grand jury selection should be applied to decisions to prosecute.' 3 0 To make out a prima facie case of selective prosecution under the dissent's standard, a defendant must show that 1)"he is a member of a recognizable, distinct class"; 2)"a disproportionate number of the class was selected for investigation and possible prosecution"; and 3)"this selection procedure was subject to abuse or was otherwise not neutral."' 3 1
Despite the confusing standards enunciated in Wayte, Justice Souter concluded that district courts have the authority to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion and to grant a remedy.' 3 2 However, instead of untangling the standard set out in Wayte and then proceeding to describe to what extent it is applied to the area at issue in Wade, Justice Souter merely stated that relief may be granted if the prosecutor's refusal to file a motion for substantial assistance was based on an "unconstitutional motive." 1
33
What Justice Souter did, in effect, was take an unclear case in the already unclear area of selective prosecution 3 4 and attempt to use that case as a basis to establish the appropriate standards for prosecutorial discretion in filing substantial assistance motion, an unresolved area of the law. The effect of such actions will be to make the area of a prosecutor's discretion whether to file a motion for substantial assistance as unclear as selective prosecution, if not more so.
The There is no reason to believe that the standards which have evolved in the area of selective prosecution apply, afortiori, in the area of sentencing. The policy rationales and justifications supporting prosecutorial discretion in the area of sentencing are likely to be different than those in the area of selective prosecution. For example, a prosecutor's discretion at the charging phase would seem to have a greater effect on defendants than the exercise of discretion with respect to a substantial assistance motion. This is because the decision at the sentencing phase only concerns a possible reduction in sentence, while a decision at the charging phase concerns what charges, if any, a defendant may face. Moreover, rules established in the sentencing area arose from additional policies established by the guidelines, which should be taken into consideration. These Congressional policies should have been examined by Justice Souter and compared to those that exist in the area of selective prosecution. Additionally, the grand jury and the reasonable doubt standard, which serve to protect a defendant from a prosecutor's discretion in the area of prosecution, are not present as protection in the sentencing area. 1 36 Finally, because the factors used to determine whether to prosecute have been found to be "ill-suited tojudicial review.. . " courts have been "hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute."' 3 7 Whether the same degree of latitude is appropriate in evaluating the prosecutor's decision to file a substantial assistance motion is an important issue passed over by Justice Souter. For these reasons, it may be appropriate to have different standards even though equal protection analysis is appropriate in both areas.
If lower courts embrace these ambiguous standards enunciated in Wade and blindly apply them, grossly inequitable results could ensue. This is potentially the most damaging aspect ofJustice Souter's lack of clarity. At least in cases that arose before Wade, when no clear standard was enunciated, lower courts could have considered the rationale of a chosen standard and its appropriateness to 135 Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1843. 136 However, it can be argued that once a defendant has already been convicted, he does not "deserve" as much protection.
137 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-08 (1985).
the area before applying it. Now, these same courts are forced to apply the standards carelessly laid out in Wade.
Instead of remedying this carelessness, Justice Souter furthered the ambiguity created by Wayte in a brief discussion of what Wade would have to show to obtain discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Justice Souter undertook this discussion through a series of negative inferences which, once again, leave one mystified as to the boundaries of the claim. Justice Souter stated the obvious when he said that mere allegations of "substantial assistance will not entitle a defendant to a remedy."' 3 8 Furthermore, he added that general allegations of improper motive are also not enough.' 3 9 Justice Souter never explained if "general allegations of improper motives" are insufficient because they are general or because more is needed than improper motives. In either case, however, Justice Souter seems to have misunderstood the nature of the claim. Allegations should only have to be general because the defendant has yet to obtain discovery or an evidentiary hearing. This rationale is somewhat analogous to "notice pleading" in the area of civil procedure where a plaintiff is not required to describe his claim in great detail in order to a state a cause of action. 1 40 Additionally, "improper motives" should be sufficient if improper motives are those that are not "rationally related to any legitimate state objective."' 4 1 Justice Souter said that the "rationally related" standard is sufficient to entitle a defendant to relief;' 4 2 however, as mentioned above, he said that improper motives are not. dard, Justice Souter cited Chapman v. United States, 153 a due process case dealing not with prosecutorial discretion, but with whether a given construction of a statute-concerning the method used to determine the weight of narcotics-was constitutional. In Chapman, the Court held that Congress had a rational basis in choosing to punish drug offenders based on the diluted weight of the drug as sold on the street as opposed to the weight of pure drug within the confiscated supply.1 5 4 Justice Souter's decision to rely on this case, instead of relying on the selective prosecution cases that he cited earlier, is beyond comprehension. Chapman did involve an application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, but in an area so unrelated that an attempt at analogy without discussion seems fatuous.
The second flaw with Justice Souter's analysis in denying Wade a remand is that even underJustice Souter's ambiguous standards, it appears that Wade did, in fact, show enough to be entitled to a remand. The purpose of the remand is not to automatically entitle Wade to an evidentiary hearing or discovery, but to allow him the opportunity to allege the facts necessary to support a claim under the standard Justice Souter should have clearly announced. If after a remand Wade still failed to make a "substantial threshold showing," then the case could be dismissed. This is contrary to Justice Souter's opinion, which would seem to require Wade to make this showing before receiving any form of discovery through remand.
Justice Souter held that Wade was not entitled to a remand because he had neither alleged nor claimed to have evidence that would entitle him to relief. 15 5 Wade replied that he would have developed a claim in the district court but that the district court frustrated this effort because it erroneously believed that this decision was unreviewable. 156 Petitioner explained that while the district court allowed petitioner to "state for the record ... what the evidence would be," it did not allow him to actually present evidence or explain the basis for his challenge of the prosecutor's decision. 15 7 Additionally, when petitioner complained about being interrupted before finishing his statement, the district court responded by saying that he could appeal his decision. 158 Nevertheless, Justice Souter held that the record showed no claim of frustration of petitioner's attempt to plead an adequate claim.' 59 In addition to the fact that Wade's attempt to allege an unconstitutional motive was apparently frustrated, Wade should have been entitled to a remand. The district court was under the impression that no claim for review of the prosecutor's decision could stand. Therefore, there was no reason for either the district court or petitioner to know what should be expected from such a claim. Even if the district court had given him ample opportunity to state his claim for the record, Wade should still be entitled to a remand so he could state a claim under the appropriate standard established by the Supreme Court in this case. 16 0 Under the above scenario, there should be a presumption that a remand be given because the danger that a district court will not adequately consider a defendant's claim seems high when a court believes that no claim can be stated under any circumstances. In sum, Justice Souter's failure to remand this case demonstrates a failure by the Court to understand the purpose of a remand in a case involving a lower court's misapplication of the law.
D. FUTURE IMPACT OF WADE
It seems apparent that the Wade decision leaves lower courts in a quagmire. 16 1 It follows from the discussion above that after Wade, 159 Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844. 160 As demonstrated above, this would be no easy task considering the extreme ambiguity of Souter's opinion.
161 As of October 2, 1992, a WESTLAW search revealed seventeen cases citing Wade. Most of these cases cited the opinion only for the proposition that the government motion requirement is constitutional, that the prosecutor's refusal to file a motion for substantial assistance is reviewable or that more than substantial assistance is necessary to entitle a defendant to relief. 
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lower courts can be sure only that a prosecutor's discretion is reviewable if it is based on an unconstitutional motive. In addition, it seems that the motive must be one not rationally related to a legitimate state objective. However, Wade gives courts virtually no additional guidance. Lower courts are therefore left with the unenviable task of determining the limits of this apparently limited judicial review. One important factor courts should consider in making this determination is the relationship between the justifications for prosecutorial discretion in sentencing and the justifications for prosecutorial discretion in the selective prosecution area. This factor was completly ignored by Justice Souter, which could lead to greater problems than a lack of clarity. If the justifications in the two areas are different enough, the use of the selective prosecution standards in the area of sentencing could lead to deleterious results. This could occur because if the rationales and policy justification underlying the two areas are different, as discussed above, 62 there would be no reason to believe that the standards designed to protect defendants in selective prosecution cases would adequately protect the rights of a defendant in the area of sentencing. Courts should also consider methods of promoting the reforms of the sentencing guidelines. After Wade, no attorney is likley to advise his client to give a prosecutor information without an explicit plea agreement. However, defendants may still decide to divulge information because of the unequal bargaining power that exists between prosecutors and defendants at this point. By the time these sentencing issues are discussed, the defendant has generally either been found guilty or has pled guilty. Consequently, the defendant has nothing to lose by offering the prosecutor information in the hope that the prosecutor will later decide to file a motion in return. Prosecutors realize this, so they will have little incentive to offer anything up front. However, the government has a strong interest in encouraging defendants to cooperate, since this type of information is vital to prosecutors seeking convictions. Therefore, there is little incentive for prosecutors to misuse their power to file a substantial assistance motion.1 6 3 How this dynamic plays out in police stations and court-607 A.2d 974, 979 (NJ. 1992) (sympathy and compassion are in appropriate consideration in sentencing deliberation because they are not factors which are "rationally related to any legitimate government end"). 162 See supra text accompanying notes. 163 See United States v. LaGuardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1016 (1st Cir. 1990).
